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ABSTRACT
Complementing international relations theories with indigenous
perspectives has become ever more relevant with the pace of
change in international aﬀairs. BRICS is one of the new initiatives
that can be seen as factors driving that change. Yet, it is diﬃcult to
theorise BRICS as an international agent, especially in the context
of global governance. This article has two objectives: ﬁrst, to
theorise international relations from a non-Western perspective,
i.e. through an interpretation of an Indian classic, Kautilya’s
Arthashastra; and second, to employ that interpretation to con-
ceptualise BRICS. As a litmus test for the analytical viability of the
Kautilyan perspective, this paper uses it to decipher a puzzle that
some scholars have called the BRICS paradox, i.e. the mismatch
between theoretical expectations and reality. This paper ﬁnds that
the Kautilyan perspective as developed here seems to pass the
test and explain the BRICS paradox. Having sought to test
Kautilyan concepts in the contemporary context, the paper con-
ﬁrms the analytical value of the ancient theorisations and their
potential for contemporary IR scholarship.
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Introduction: changing international order and the BRICS paradox
Since the 1990s, the question of how global power transitions aﬀect the liberal interna-
tional order has puzzled international relations (IR) scholars.1 The realist perspective
tends to emphasize the geopolitical and competitive dimension of the rise of the
emerging powers and the formation of new international institutions by them.2 Those
who focus on institutional and normative continuities, on the other hand, are keen to
point out that none of the emerging powers or new initiatives has in a direct manner
sought to oppose or reform the institutional bedrock of global governance.3 Still others
have focused on ideational and conceptual transformations. Echoing Huntington’s
observations about the empowerment of cultural identities, scholars like Amitav
Acharya and Barry Buzan have argued that there is a growing interest in local perspec-
tives to IR theories and a demand for a global IR built on a dialogue between them and
the established Western perspectives.4
The grouping of Brazil, Russia, India, China in 2006, and later South Africa in 2010,
referred to as BRICS, is a case in point for these transformations. Yet, the conundrum of
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global power transitions, and new international institutions like BRICS and their implica-
tions for the liberal international order, remains an object of empirical and conceptual
debate. This article provides an additional conceptual perspective to these debates. Its
objective is a conceptual analysis of an Indian classic, Kautilya’s Arthashastra, to develop
a local perspective to BRICS studies, and the study of international relations in general.
Three reasons legitimise the use of a local perspective on BRICS studies. First is the
lack of broadly accepted theorisations about BRICS and the persisting debate about its
political nature. Second is the uncertainty over the application of Kautilyan conceptua-
lisations on BRICS: we do not yet know whether Kautilya can be useful in BRICS studies,
what results a Kautilyan perspective yields and how it relates to other interpretations.
The perhaps ambiguous notion that BRICS scholarship has not been conceptually
saturated, which underpins the above reasoning, provides a third and more general
argument for the research task in this study. It is also a central argument for using non-
Western perspectives and thus treated with more detail in Section 2, ‘Who was Kautilya
and why is his Arthashastra relevant?’
BRICS has been subjected to various, sometimes contradictory, conceptualisations.
Some scholars have interpreted it as a challenger to Western dominance and the
promoter of a new international order.5 Others have claimed it to be more of a paper
tiger and of little relevance because its members were quarrelsome and tended to
support the existing liberal institutions.6 Moreover, while BRICS has succeeded in creat-
ing two new ﬁnancial institutions, the New Development Bank (NDB) and the
Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA), it has not produced a BRICS Consensus, leaving
critics of neo-liberal development policies disappointed and disillusioned.7 Against this
background, some scholars have sought to describe these diﬀerent and conﬂicting
interpretations as the BRICS paradox.8
According to The Merriam Webster Dictionary, a paradox can be ‘an argument that
apparently derives self-contradictory conclusions by valid deduction from acceptable
premises’. The BRICS paradox derives from certain theoretical premises about interna-
tional relations that pose such expectations and lead to interpretations that do not seem
to match with the reality.
One major aspect of the BRICS paradox is regarding BRICS’ position within the
contending-dominant power continuum or the classic realist narrative that links inter-
national order with cycles of hegemonic rise and fall.9 For example, power transition
theorists argue that the international order always tends to be structured hierarchically
with a preponderant power at the top of its hierarchy. During a decline of a former
hegemon, power transition is likely to produce a contender, either as a group of states
or one single great power.10 Various scholars have already shown that this does not ﬁt
well with BRICS.11
The same holds for the balance of power theory when employed in this context of
hegemonic realism. It proposes that augmentation of power by one actor disrupts the
balance in a system and thus is followed by rebalancing measures by other actors in the
same system.12 This would suggest that though BRICS started as a coalition against
Western dominance, with the increase of Chinese inﬂuence in world aﬀairs, it would
meet with rebalancing eﬀorts by either Russia or India, or even both. However, there is
not enough empirical evidence to support this theoretical deduction. Rather, the evi-
dence is contradictory. First, under the Narendra Modi government, India has become
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the US’ partner in the Indo-Paciﬁc and has actively sought closer ties with Japan and
Australia. This can be seen as a reaction to China’s growing presence in South Asia and
the Indo-Paciﬁc. In Summer 2017, during the so called Doklam crisis, Sino-Indian
tensions came close to a military showdown. These examples support the notion of
rebalancing eﬀorts and conﬂicting relations among the BRICS countries.
Second, and in spite of these tensions, there is also plenty of Sino-Indian and intra-
Asian cooperation, particularly in terms of economic and ﬁnancial integration. BRICS is
just one of the many instances where hugely heterogeneous emerging powers have
more or less equal inﬂuence and where inter-state conﬂicts have been put aside for the
aspiration of common objectives and international cooperation. According to some
scholars,13 these observations challenge the general viability of the hegemonic realism
and the contending-dominant power dichotomy. However, as they draw on European
experiences, it would seem logical that they are partially context-speciﬁc.14 Indeed,
some commentators have argued that international pluralism, coexistence of coopera-
tion and rivalries, is deeply embedded in both past and present Asian politics; Asian
powers, China and India included, would seem to endorse this as a positive feature.15
European experience with rivalries, on the other hand, has been less positive. Section 2
will present this theoretical contextuality as one of the reasons to expand the repertoire
of IR theory with local perspectives, as has been done in this paper.
BRICS may not have challenged the current international order, but it has posed
a challenge for scholars attempting to understand it. On the one hand, BRICS may be
seen as a process in making, or that it is merely a paper tiger without any of the ferocity
of the real beast. Alternatively, it could be that, as part of a new and emerging reality, we
are lacking in the proper analytical tools needed to assess its true potential. Thus, as
Michael Liebig has argued, indigenous traditions provide us with untapped resources to
develop analytical tools to study IR.16 According to the proponents of the so-called
global IR, this is not just a research gap in the specialized BRICS scholarship.17 Instead,
broader usage of local perspectives would beneﬁt the development of IR theory in
general. This article contributes with a non-Western local perspective to the contem-
porary BRICS scholarship.
The focus of the article is on developing an interpretation of the Indian classic,
Kautilya’s Arthashastra, which is an ancient Sanskrit treatise on statecraft and foreign
policy. The litmus test of the analytical viability of the Kautilyan perspective developed
here consists of using this perspective to explain the BRICS paradox. This is in response
to the interest in and demand for developing local IR perspectives. By developing
a Kautilyan perspective and testing its analytical viability, this article also provides
a conceptual framework that can be used to study how and to what extent – if at
all – this perspective diﬀers from the established or Western IR theories, and to what
extent it resonates with them. In other words, it seeks to provide a perspective that can
be employed in the further development of global IR perspectives.
The article is divided as follows: The second section provides the reasoning for why
Kautilya is a relevant source in IR. It also provides some methodological notes about how
I read the Arthashastra. The third section presents some of Kautilya’s key concepts in
terms of international relations and seeks to interpret them for the purposes of con-
temporary foreign policy analysis. The fourth section applies the analytical framework on
explaining BRICS, and the ﬁfth section summarises the conclusions reached.
THIRD WORLD THEMATICS: A TWQ JOURNAL 491
Who was Kautilya and why is his Arthashastra relevant?
Kautilya, also known as Chanakya, was a Brahman scholar and political advisor living
during and after the turbulences of Alexander the Great’s conquests. Though there is
some uncertainty about it, the predominant understanding is that the Arthashastra, an
extensive treatise in statecraft and foreign policy, was authored by Kautilya. Kautilya,
who, together with Thucydides, can be considered one of the ﬁrst realists, served as
chief minister and councillor of the Indian king, Chandragupta Maurya (321–296 BCE). It
is thought that Kautilya's advice helped Chandragupta to establish an empire of his own
in the Indian peninsula, an empire which at its peak covered most of contemporary
South Asia.18
With over 200,000 words in the English translation and more extensive than
Aristotle's Politics, Kautilya’s Arthashastra counts among the ﬁnest specimen of ancient
literature.19 However, unlike Politics, Arthashastra was lost until 1904 when it was
discovered by Dr R. Shamasastry. Welcoming its recovery, scholars like Max Weber
compared Arthashastra with ancient Hellenic literature on statecraft, while Johann
Jakob Meyer, a German Indologist, referred to it as the ‘library of ancient India’.20 In
spite of having been lost, various scholars have argued that at least some elements of
the Arthashastra survived and were passed on by oral tradition through Hindu epics
such as the Mahabharata and Ramayana, as well as through social structures, religious
beliefs and legal codes like the laws of Manu.21
For IR studies, Kautilya is relevant in at least four ways. First, classical texts provide
an important source from which to reconceptualise the present, to rethink, reﬁne and
even challenge well-established theorisations. While historians seek to understand,
explain and even reconstruct the past, political theorists attempt to hypothesise the
present. In this sense, political theorists are not faithful to the past. They can use
classical texts to develop new solutions to old problems or redeﬁne old problems in
new contexts. Thus, in my reading of Kautilya’s Arthashastra, I seek the tools to
conceptualise the present.22 This objective aligns the present paper with IR theory
and foreign policy analysis while setting it apart from works in history of ideas,
although these are never fully separate.23
Second, Kautilya forms a crucial element in the conceptual history of IR. Embedded in
the historical context of the Hindu king Chandragupta’s empire building, Arthashastra
opens a window to ancient Indian scholarship and the political thought of one of the
world’s ﬁrst great civilisations. Yet, unlike Thucydides, Kautilya did not seek to describe
past battles but provide a manual for future conquests. Still, as his theories gaineda
broad audience and inﬂuential followers, they provide tools to understand South Asian
history and statecraft.24 Third, they are are also useful for studying India’s contemporary
foreign politics and have been used in this manner by, for instance, Aparna Pande,
Shyam Saran and Alyssa Ayres.25
Fourth, and related to the ﬁrst, Kautilya’s Arthashastra can be used to complement
and develop contemporary IR. There is a particular need for this, depending on the
claimed contextual or historic-political bias of Western IR theory.26 The relevance of
European history has been pointed out by for example John Hobson and John
Ikenberry.27 Some others, like Kees van der Pijl,28 emphasise the role of US foreign
policy interests. Non-Western perspectives and the development of the so called Global
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IR seek to remedy these issues.29 They have also been seen as part of the epistemic
decolonisation of IR,30 but they also help to better understand rising powers and their
foreign policies31 as well as the international order in the post-hegemonic era.32
Furthermore, some scholars have employed local historical traditions to imagine and
conceptualize global ethics. For example Bruce Rich has studied Kautilya and the legacy
of Chandragupta's grandson, Ashoka, for this purpose.33
Having used the concept of Western IR, it should perhaps be noted, as Bilgin34 and
Acharya35 have argued, that it is analytically challenging if not impossible to exclusively
deﬁne what actually is Western about Western IR or what constitutes the inherently non-
Western dimensions in non-Western IR. Like technological innovations, ideas too have
travelled across regions, mutated on theway and assimilated into new contexts.36 In addition,
focus on at least partly artiﬁcial categorisations can strengthen exclusiveness whereas
emphasis on what unites and what is common can be seen to increase positive sentiments
across various kinds of boundaries. From this perspective, the concept of ‘non-Western’ may
contain false connotations about the separateness of, for example, Indian and Chinese
traditions, even if those form important building blocks of what is meant by ‘Western’.
Consequently, indigenous traditions should not be studied to serve national pride
or civilisational confrontations. Rather, it should be the realisation that the epistemic
sources of IR should reﬂect the pluralism of the current international order that
should motivate such studies. In the past, the US got the chance to develop, employ
and interpret IR for its own purposes, to legitimise its supremacy. This resulted in
contextual biases. Hence, to unravel the secrets of the present world, we need not
only to acknowledge and understand the particularistic and contextual ﬁnesse of
ideas, but also to seek to replenish our conceptual sources.37 This is what the next
section devotes itself to.
Kautilyan international relations and foreign policy
This section presents Kautilya’s key concepts of international relations and foreign policy
analysis and attempts to interpret them. Early works by Sarkar and Modelski, and more
recent works by, for example, Boesche, Zaman, Gautam, Mitra and Liebig have already
sought to connect Kautilyan concepts with present-day political science terminology.38
Following Gautam, I have in a previous study divided Kautilya's foreign policy frame
work into the following seven elements: (1) a speciﬁc type of king, the conqueror, (2)
measures to overcome opposition, (3) the seven constituent elements of state, (4) six
measures of foreign policy,(5) mandala system of international relations, (6) three ways
of conquest and (7) three ways of war. In this article, I will instead focus on only three,
the mandala, the constituent elements of state and conquest. I interpret that these three
elements in Kautilya's foreign policy framework can be expanded to broader analytical
concepts providing perspectives to (1) the organizing principles of international rela-
tions, (2) overarching leadership goals of transnational agents and (3) the foreign policy
obligation of an aspirant global leader.39
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The logic of international relations
The Merriam Webster Dictionary deﬁnes mandala as ‘a graphic and often symbolic
pattern usually in the form of a circle divided into four separate sections’. In Kautilya’s
Arthashastra, it refers to circles of kings, and an international system based on strategic
relations between them. The central nodes in the mandala system, the four circles of
kings, are four types of kings: conqueror, conqueror’s enemy, middle power and neutral
power. Each of the circles, moreover, consists of the friends and allies of their nodal
power, be it the conqueror, conqueror’s enemy, middle king or the neutral power. In
addition, king does not merely denote ruler but also, depending on the context, the
whole state.40
The four central nodes of Kautilya’s mandala system have particular characteristics. The
most powerful state, the so-called neutral king, is deﬁned as one that would have the
material capabilities to resist and even subjugate each of the minor kings individually, but is
situated beyond their territories. This great power regards the lesser states with indiﬀerence
because, for Kautilya, enmity depends primarily on territorial proximity. The middle king is
the second strongest state, but it also shares territory with minor powers. Conqueror and its
enemy are the lesser states that also share a common border.41 As Arthashastra is written
without direct historical references, various scholars agree that the mandala system is
primarily a conceptualisation of possible strategic relations between them, even though
Boesche has shown that it also has a descriptive dimension.42
The concepts of enmity and friendship lie at the heart of the mandala’s strategic
function. Yet, for Kautilya, enemy is a state that ‘is situated anywhere immediately on the
circumference of the conqueror’s territory’.43 Benoy Sarkar, writing during World War I,
adopted this idea without deeper scrutiny. Gautam, conversely, has noted that while the
natural enemy of any state is bound to be its neighbour, not all neighbours are
enemies.44 Still, to get an idea about the organising principle in the mandala’s strategic
function, we should consider what factors cause enmity in the neighbourhood.
Some of the obvious reasons are competition for the same resources like arable land,
woods or metals, dependence on the same source of water, increases in population, and
migration and the potential colonisation resulting from it. These become causes of
conﬂict only between peoples who live close to each other. Even today these matters
are relevant to a certain extent, yet global markets and the relative ease of travelling
reduces dependency on the neighbourhood. Consequently, I would argue that instead
of neighbourhood, enmity results from conﬂicting strategic interests, which in Kautilya’s
historic context tended to coincide with territorial proximity. This resonates with Liebig’s
extrapolation about Kautilya’s matsya-nyāya, or the ‘law of the ﬁshes’, or ‘law of the
jungle’, which deﬁne conﬂicting interests as the natural condition of human life.45
As a result, the constitution of the circles of states, and their relations with each other,
are a question of conﬂicting interests between them. This modiﬁcation makes it possible
to expand the applicability of the mandala. While territorial borders in IR apply to states,
conﬂicting interests apply also on other governance institutions as much as matters of
international and transnational interdependences. Thus, it seems both possible and
plausible to deﬁne mandala as a conceptualisation of transnational relations structured
by how diﬀerent agents relate to: (1) each other in terms of size and inﬂuence; and (2)
matters of governance. A matter of governance can be a conﬂicting interest or an issue
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of interdependence between at least two actors. In the modern age, many governance
issues are not fundamentally about conﬂicting interests, but about management of
interdependences.
Overarching leadership goals
Mitra and Liebig have argued that the raison d’état of Kautilya’s political leadership is
the optimisation of state power to maintain and increase the welfare of its people. This
is because only a powerful state can ensure the welfare of its people.46 Similar to the
Chinese military strategist and writer Sun Zi, Kautilya divides power into three compo-
nents: intellectual strength (which provides good counsel); a strong army and prosper-
ous treasury, which provide for physical strength; and valour, which builds the
psychological bases of energy and morale.47 Pursuit of power is one of the factors
that renders Kautilya a realist because one of the basic premises in realism is that states
seek to maximise their power and inﬂuence.
Yet, Kautilya’s realism is conditional. A king is bound to do his best for the welfare of
his subjects: ‘In the happiness of his subjects lies his happiness; in their welfare his
welfare.’ Welfare is the goal, and realist politics the tool. How then does Chanakya deﬁne
welfare? He deﬁnes it as material well-being, acquisition and abundance of wealth:
Hence the king shall ever be active and discharge his duties; the root of wealth is activity,
and of evil its reverse. In the absence of activity acquisitions present and to come will perish;
by activity he can achieve both his desired ends and abundance of wealth.48
[W]hen the king is well oﬀ, by his welfare and prosperity, he pleases the people; of what
kind the king’s character is, of the same kind will be the character of his people; for their
progress or downfall, the people depend upon the king; the king is, as it were, the
aggregate of the people.49
State power is not just an extension of the elements of power (intellectual, moral and
material capacities and possessions) on an abstract idea of state. In fact, Kautilya’s
seven-fold typology of state, or the ‘constituent elements’, ‘state factors’ or ‘elements
of sovereignty’, are fully comparable with twentieth-century realist conceptualisations
of state power.50 Kautilya operationalises the optimisation of power through the
following state factors: (1) king, ruler; (2) government, administrative bodies; (3)
productive capabilities like agriculture; (4) capital or fortiﬁed city; (5) treasury or
perhaps the tax base and tax income; (6) army; and (7) allies.51 State power refers
to optimisation of intellectual, moral and material capacities and possession of all
these seven factors.
For the purposes of modern analysis, some modiﬁcations of these elements are in
order. The king and ministers should be considered in the broader sense of an eﬃcient
government and the ability of a central authority to exercise decisive inﬂuence on its
subjects. This aspect is strong in Kautilya’s ‘despotic’ administrative system, as described
by Boesche.52 Today the third factor, i.e. productive capabilities, would encompass not
only natural resources, but also productive forces like an industrial base. It would also
embody connectivity to international markets, position in regional and global value
chains, as well as other elements that form the preconditions of economic productivity
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and competitiveness, like social and physical infrastructure.53 The treasury and tax base
are still applicable.
The fortiﬁed city, constructed in order to protect the population against enemy
troops, would need some modiﬁcations to become a useful category for contemporary
analysis. Societal resilience might be a useful replacement for the ancient concept of
a fortiﬁed city. It encompasses elements of both external and internal security. It also
covers the soft elements of societal cohesiveness, approval of government and a critical
and well-informed world-view which provide a fortiﬁcation against inimical inﬂuence.
Indeed, these elements of resilience ﬁnd expression in Kautilya’s theory of society, which
combines social control and administration with the material well-being of people and
the general acceptability of the king and social hierarchies. However, he does not list
these as part of the elements of sovereignty.54
In the Kautilyan formulation, there is also a non-material aspect to strength and
happiness, one deﬁned by Vedic tradition and the hierarchical social structure of the
Aryan caste system. Living well in this context implies fulﬁlling one’s duties as a member
of a caste as given.55 In a society where the caste system has been imprinted on people’s
minds, stark inequalities in economic and social standing are acceptable because the
beliefs underpinning them form a basis of their legitimacy. With regard to societal
resilience, stability and predictability, kingly rule in a Brahmanical society thus bears
a distinct resemblance to a system based on rule of law.
Out of the last two state factors, army and allies, the latter is highly relevant in the
modern context, deﬁned by environmental and economic interdependences. These ties,
I would argue, cause a fundamental transformation in the nature and operational logic of
the mandala system. For example, the productive forces of any country are dependent on
their connections with other countries. Various transnational governance institutions reg-
ulate how and between whom these connections are built and supervised. As a result,
cooperation permeates most of Kautilya’s state factors: the circles of states in a modern
mandala become intertwined and tie kingly obligations in one political entity with the
happiness of people in another. This leaves enmity or zero-sum games with only a side role.
Thus, the raison d’être of leadership in the modern era mandala can be deﬁned as
optimisation of welfare in the often transnationally intertwined state factors. Leadership
in this context can be about solving common problems.56
An additional feature in Kautilya’s conceptualisation of state, which strengthens this
interpretation, is the open character of Kautilya’s state: it is not territorially bound, nor
nationally or ethnically deﬁned. According to Shyam Saran, this openness is distinctive in
Asian political history. It would explain why pluralism and international anarchy appear
so much more acceptable concepts in Asia than in Europe, the battleground of the
Westphalian nation-states.57
Conquest as a foreign policy obligation
Benoy Sarkar described Kautilya’s mandala as a ‘cult of expansion’. Sarkar connected
expansionism with world conquest; Boesche also hints at this. Liebig and Gautam, in
contrast, restrict Kautilya’s expansionism to the geographic and civilisational sphere of
the Indian subcontinent.58 Nonetheless, conquest forms an essential part of Kautilya’s
theory, where the would-be-conqueror or vijigisu is a central actor.
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Conqueror is a singular type of king because of its normative character, and its role in
the international system. The normative dimension of the conqueror refers to certain
qualities that legitimise the vijigisu’s role as a conqueror. The conqueror should possess
excellent personal qualities, and be industrious in attaining and improving his skills and
abilities. He should husband his time eﬃciently according to a carefully planned sche-
dule, and never let selﬁsh desires and urges dictate his actions.59
In addition to these features, the vijigisu is distinctive because of conquest. The
Arthashastra classiﬁes conquests into three groups: (1) righteous; (2) greedy; and (3)
demonical. A just conqueror, our vijigisu, does not necessarily need to seek usurpation or
extension of his state’s belongings. Territorial takeover, moreover, would likely involve
death, loss of money and impoverishment. It would not necessarily be conducive to the
happiness and welfare of his people, least of all those newly subjected to his rule. In the
Arthashastra, we read that a ‘king [. . .], being possessed of good character and best-ﬁtted
elements of sovereignty’ and seeking conquest, should be neither demonic nor greedy.
If he would act in any other way than righteous, he would create the space and need for
another state to seek a new conqueror. This is because it is the duty of a king to aspire
for the welfare and happiness of his people, which is impossible under a demonic ruler
and diﬃcult with a greedy one.60
To be able to conquer, the vijigisu should have the necessary material and non-
material capabilities both to conquer and to maintain a dominant position after the
conquest. To establish himself, he needs to set up his rule in a manner that advances the
happiness and welfare of the new subjects, thus binding them to the king for material
gains and for non-material reasons. The non-material reasons in Kautilya’s Arthashastra
have to do with the Brahmanical order and virtues which deepen the moral dimension
of Kautilya’s realism.61
As a result, Kautilya’s conquest does not generate rights without obligations. Instead,
by extending the kingdom, conquest also extends the obligations that come with
leadership. In this sense, the ethical and material are inseparably intertwined.
Interestingly, this seems to resonate with certain modern concepts. There is, for instance,
a similarity between ‘benevolent superpower’ and ‘liberal international order’ on the one
side, and the vijigisu and ‘conquest’ on the other. As noted by Liebig, these conceptual
interfaces deserve ‘long overdue’ scholarly attention. However, they are out of the scope
of this particular paper.62
Now, if we maintain that the mandala in the contemporary context can be regarded as
a certain type of strategic constellation of diverse interests around a governance issue, or,
more narrowly, a constellation of state relations with regard to a matter of governance, then
to conquer means to solve this issue. A righteous conquest would imply a solution that
improves or secures the welfare of the vijigisu and the conquered. For example, a mutually
beneﬁcial trade agreement, or a port or railway connection, would correspond to righteous
conquest, while a trade war would imply a greedy conquest.
Towards a framework of analysis
In this section, I have discussed Kautilya’s key concepts of international relations and
foreign policy and, through interpretative analysis, sought to adapt them to the present-
day context. I have paid particular attention to the organising principle in Kautilya’s
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mandala arguing that strategic relations do not depend on territorial proximity between
territorial political entities or nation-states. Instead, mandala can be deﬁned as
a compound of multiple and overlapping transnational relations structured by how
diﬀerent agents relate to (1) each other in terms of size and inﬂuence; and (2) how
these agents relate to a matter of governance, dispute or common concern.
The basic unit in the mandala is the state, conceived of as a compound of seven
elements, none of which, in the contemporary world, is fully independent or sovereign,
but which is tied to other states, friends and enemies alike, with at least some environ-
mental, economic and international connections. The objective of each state is the
optimisation of the immaterial and material dimensions of each of the seven transna-
tionally interdependent state factors, which would obligate leaders or at least the vijigisu
to aspire for win-win solutions instead of zero-sum outcomes. This holds in cases where
the circle of states is intertwined through interdependent constituent elements.
Finally, the ideal leader would be one that employs all measures in hand to ensure
successful win-win solutions for common concerns, while ensuring neutrality or zero-
sum gains in cases where the mandala is divided into clearly separate circles, and where
the state factors of each central node of each circle are disconnected. Let me synthesise
these notions shortly as a tentative analytical framework:
(1) A key foreign policy objective is righteous conquest. In the context of multiple
and overlapping circles consisting of transnationally intertwined state factors,
righteous conquest denotes successful leadership in optimisation of welfare in
the interconnected political entities through win-win solutions for common pro-
blems. The modern vijigisu has mastery over the complex web of mandalas,
knows how to keep them separate (e.g., does not mix political conﬂicts with
economic cooperation), and has the ability to exercise eﬀective leadership.
(2) In deﬁning the operational environment for foreign policy manoeuvres, primary
focus is on what constitutes a given mandala:
● What are the conﬂicting interests/common problems?
● What kinds of agents are involved?
● What does the vijigisu do to lead or overcome, by what means and how
successfully?
● What are the shortcomings of his leadership?
● From the normative perspective, what should the vijigisu do and who or what is
most suitable to be a vijigisu?
BRICS and the multiple and overlapping mandalas
To deﬁne BRICS as an international agent and to conceptualise its relationship with the
changing international order is considered a challenge by BRICS scholars. The BRICS
countries portray some elements beﬁtting various theoretical conceptualisations. It
seems to be a bit of many things, but not fully anything. This, at least, is the interpreta-
tion behind the BRICS paradox.
The BRICS paradox can be deﬁned as a theoretically grounded chain of arguments
that lead to deductions about BRICS that are not coherent with empirical reality, or at
least seem controversial or ambiguous. One aspect of the paradox evolves from the idea
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that because the BRICS countries are so heterogeneous, i.e. because they lack the
political, geographic, ideational and constructivist elements that, particularly from the
perspective of European integration theories, are necessary for eﬃcient cooperation,
BRICS is deﬁned as fundamentally a paper tiger with little expectations regarding its
global role. Another perspective, this one grounded in power transition theory, expects
the BRICS countries to align to challenge either the hierarchical order of states in the
increasingly obsolete US-led world order, or the norms and institutions of the current
system in order to reform them to better ﬁt their own interests. There is contradictory
evidence for both these claims.
In Kautilyan terms, the organising principle in both these claims relates to some
aspects of global interdependence, governance issues or conﬂicting interests. The
Kautilyan perspective would thus suggest conceptualising these puzzles through rela-
tively narrow, issue-speciﬁc mandalas. In other words, this perspective would solve the
paradox by changing the premises leading to it. Of course, no theory is perfect, but most
theories can convey some important information. Comparative studies would tell us that
BRICS is neither a federation nor a supranational governance entity, but an interstate
alliance subject to conﬂicts or dissonance between its members. The Kautilyan perspec-
tive can add to this type of analysis with insights about what the elements are that bind
the BRICS countries together, and how they relate to the elements that separate them or
create potential for conﬂicts within BRICS. For this, the Kautilyan perspective provides
the tools of multiple and overlapping mandalas.
What then are the BRICS mandalas? According to BRICS summit documents, BRICS
was formed as a reaction to the ‘major and swift changes’ in world aﬀairs and the
resulting need ‘for corresponding transformations in global governance’. The values that
the BRICS have underlined in all of their summit declarations include mutual respect,
cooperation, coordinated action and collective decision-making in ‘a multipolar, equi-
table and democratic world order’.63 As a result, the organising principles for the BRICS
mandala are the relation of each international agent towards these values, pluralism and
the ‘corresponding reforms’ in global governance.
The United Nations (UN), International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade
Organization (WTO) are three of the most important governance institutions of the so-
called liberal international order. They are also the objects of BRICS’ critique, causes of
conﬂicting relations, and the targets of conquest. Yet, the source of critique is not in the
principles of these institutions. Instead, enmity arises from the discrepancy between
values and practices. In spite of the power shift, the US and the developed countries still
maintain a strong position in these institutions even today, and the system that should
generate indiscriminatory gains for all still produces disproportionate beneﬁts to the
already powerful companies, countries and groups of people.64 This is what the BRICS
countries have argued they want to change.
Indeed, the shortcomings of what in critical political economy literature is called the
neo-liberal political economy, dearly felt in the Global South, has been one source of
major expectations for alternative development models and thus also for actual ﬁnancial
and trade initiatives for that purpose. For example, Duggan65 and Mielniczuk66 have
separately shown that the BRICS discourse about development and political economy
deviates from the established neo-liberal jargon. Neither of them, however, is able to
demonstrate that the BRICS actually have an alternative agenda. Other scholars have
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shown explicitly that they don’t.67 It would appear that developmental concerns are one
mandala where BRICS might be seen as an actor, where there is demand for a vijigisu,
but where BRICS so far has not shown the necessary capacities to become one.
From a Kautilyan perspective, however, it appears that this developmental mandala is
separate from how the BRICS relate to economic globalisation. While state inﬂuence over
markets among BRICS countries is relatively extensive, BRICS have been and are major
beneﬁciaries of economic globalisation and stout supporters of capitalism.68 For example,
BRICS lending to other developing countries is as extractive as investments from the
advanced economies.69 The newly founded NDB has already been criticised for lack of
transparency and disrespect for good governance. A recent case is the contentious
infrastructure loan to Durban port in South Africa, strongly objected to by the local
population (Independent Online, 10 June 2018). Another factor is the close institutional
relations between the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) and the IMF. BRICS created
the CRA as a liquidity buﬀer against potential balance of payments problems, but when
there is need for more than 30 per cent of borrowing quota, it must ﬁrst seek structural
adjustment loans from the IMF before it can receive more support from the CRA.70
Thus, while there may not exist a mandala that is on a systemic level or that concerns
capitalism, there appears to be a narrower developmental mandala. The BRICS rhetoric
also emphasises the well-established problems of global governance – that poverty and
lack of social and physical infrastructure, water and electricity are very tangible problems
even among the BRICS themselves. Mielniczuk has argued that construction of a new
discourse can have long-term eﬀects on how we see the world, how we create shared
purposes and how we imagine the future.71 It begins with ideational delinking from
established and predominant discourses. Thus, some scholars have shown that to some
extent, the BRICS countries have already caused a rupture in ideas about development.
This is also evident from the NDB’s General Strategy,72 which seems to invite discussions
and debates on development:
The bank will constructively engage the international community as an independent voice
on development trends and practices. As a new institution, NDB has much to learn from the
wealth of experience of multilateral and bilateral development institutions, as well as civil
society and academic organizations.
In the context of the developmental mandala, there would be need for a righteous con-
queror. BRICS has at least so far failed to shoulder this responsibility even if it has created
space in both developmental discourses and institutional structures.73 If the BRICS objective
is indeed to advance reforms that are conducive to a more equitable and multipolar world
order, their promotion of ideational and discursive pluralism, be it about political economy
or cultures, should be in line with that objective. BRICS has promoted pluralism in global
institutions as well as at the regional level. During BRICS summits, it has become a practice
that the host country also organise a simultaneous conference for some regional organisa-
tion. For example, during the Ufa Summit in 2017, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
(SCO) was convened together with BRICS. In this sense, BRICS seems to be working as an
enabler and promoter of multiple layers of cooperation.
On the global level, BRICS has faced opposition from the former hegemonic powers.
For example, reforms of the IMF quota system had already been agreed upon at the
Group of 20 meeting in 2008, a year before the ﬁrst BRIC summit, but were stopped by
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the US Congress until 2016.74 That failure met with harsh criticism from the BRICS. The
BRICS summit declaration from 2015 states that ‘[w]e remain deeply disappointed with
the prolonged failure by the United States to ratify the IMF 2010 reform package, which
continues to undermine the credibility, legitimacy and eﬀectiveness of the IMF’.75
Similarly, BRICS concerns with the UN has focused on unilateralism. In various
summits, they have condemned ‘unilateral military interventions, economic sanctions
and arbitrary use of unilateral coercive measures in violation of international law’.76
Conﬂicts in Libya and Syria and the dispute about Iran’s nuclear weapons are major
triggers for these concerns. In these conﬂicts, BRICS has emphasised sovereignty and
non-interference, while responsibility to protect and human rights have been more
important for the discourse of the US and its allies. The US has been and continues to
be the ‘enemy’ also in the WTO and in matters of economic interdependencies. Prior to
the Donald Trump presidency, BRICS voiced concerns about developed country regional
trade agreements, which contain high regulatory standards that could induce additional
costs and become barriers for market access for developing countries. During the Trump
presidency, the BRICS countries have also voiced their concern over the US refusal to
appoint a WTO judge, which could ‘paralyse the dispute settlement system and under-
mine the rights and obligations of all Members’.77
Conclusion
This article has two objectives. First, it has sought to develop conceptual tools to study
international relations through an interpretative analysis of Kautilya’s
Arthashastra. Second, it has tried to apply this perspective on conceptualising BRICS
using the so-called BRICS paradox as a litmus test for the Kautilyan perspective. The
short analysis of BRICS has demonstrated the applicability of the perspective.
In terms of the Kautilyan perspective, the main conceptual contribution of this paper
relates to the concepts of mandala and conquest, or the nature of international relations
and the main foreign policy objectives. This paper argues that one of the main types of
contemporary mandalas can be deﬁned as a strategic constellation of multiple and
overlapping circles of political entities joined by transnationally intertwined state factors.
This implies that state power and its interests are not territorially bound but transna-
tionally intertwined. In this context, righteous conquest would denote successful leader-
ship in optimising welfare in the interconnected political entities or among the peoples
of transnationally intertwined states.
Both these ﬁndings seem to underline the analytical potential in this indigenous
classic. In addition, and with regard to future research, I have mentioned in the
introduction that this research provides a perspective that can be used to study
diﬀerences, commonalities and complementarities between this and the established IR
perspectives. As Kautilya was a realist political theorist, it would be particularly promis-
ing to enquire into the relationship between the Kautilyan perspective developed here
and some of the key notions in other realist theories. For example, what is the relation
between ‘transnationally intertwined state factors’ and ‘national interest’ or ‘institutional
constraints’, and how do the ideas of ‘conquest’ and the ‘circle of states’ relate to
‘multilateral diplomacy’ or ‘hegemonic transition’?
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